Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007

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Summary

New bill targets voting machine security by requiring paper ballot backups for all federal elections. Mandates random hand-count audits to verify electronic results. Provides $1 billion to help states upgrade systems by 2008.

Overview

  • Bill amends Help America Vote Act of 2002 to strengthen voting system security and accessibility
  • Introduced February 2007, reported to House May 2007
  • Targets November 2008 federal elections and beyond

Who does this affect?

  • Main groups: All voters in federal elections, election officials, voting machine manufacturers, disability rights advocates
  • Who benefits: Voters gain verifiable paper trail; states with outdated systems receive funding; voters with disabilities get improved accessible verification
  • Who loses: Voting machine manufacturers face stricter disclosure and testing requirements; jurisdictions using electronic-only systems must upgrade
  • Teen impact score: 2/10 (symbolic awareness of election integrity without direct teen participation)

What This Bill Does

  • Paper ballot requirement: Every voting system must produce voter-verified paper ballots that voters can inspect before casting. Paper serves as official record in recounts/audits, overriding electronic tallies if discrepancies arise.
  • Mandatory audits: States must conduct random hand-count audits of 3-10% of precincts (percentage based on margin of victory) within 24 hours of unofficial results. Audits publicly observable.
  • Security restrictions: Bans wireless devices in voting systems, prohibits internet connections to voting machines, requires secure chain-of-custody documentation for all voting equipment.
  • Accessibility mandate: Voting systems for voters with disabilities must allow private, independent verification of paper ballots through conversion to accessible format (audio, Braille-compatible).
  • Laboratory independence: Testing labs that certify voting systems cannot receive compensation from manufacturers; Commission randomly assigns labs to test systems via escrow account funded by manufacturer fees.
  • Disclosure requirements: Voting system software must be deposited with accredited labs; qualified persons (government officials, litigants, academic researchers) can access under nondisclosure agreements that permit security vulnerability reporting.
  • Federal funding: Authorizes $1 billion for fiscal year 2007 to help states meet new requirements, allocated based on number of noncompliant precincts in 2006 elections.
  • Enforcement: Allows individuals to file complaints with Attorney General; clarifies private right of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to enforce paper ballot rights.
  • Implementation timeline: November 2008 deadline for most requirements; jurisdictions using certain paper-ballot-equipped accessible machines in 2006 get extension to 2010 for durability/readability standards.

Legislative Status

  • Introduced in House February 5, 2007 with 216+ bipartisan cosponsors
  • Reported by House Administration Committee May 16, 2007 with amendments
  • Placed on Union Calendar, committed to Committee of the Whole House
  • Did not advance to floor vote in 110th Congress

In short

  • All federal elections must use paper ballots voters can verify before casting, with paper serving as official record.
  • States must hand-count random samples of ballots after each election to check electronic tallies.
  • Voting machines cannot connect to internet or use wireless devices; manufacturers face stricter testing and disclosure rules.
  • $1 billion authorized to help states upgrade systems by 2008.
  • Voters with disabilities get accessible ballot verification systems.

Why should I care?

Election security affects whether votes are counted accurately and whether citizens trust democratic outcomes. This bill responded to concerns about electronic voting machines after the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, when some jurisdictions used touchscreen systems with no paper trail. If electronic tallies were hacked or malfunctioned, no backup existed to verify results. Paper ballots create an auditable record independent of software. The audit requirements mean election officials must actually check whether machines counted correctly, not just assume they did. For voters with disabilities, the bill balances security (paper ballots) with accessibility (systems that read ballots aloud or convert to Braille). The bill never became law, but influenced later state-level reforms requiring paper trails and post-election audits.

What do you think about this bill?

Vote to see who sponsored it!

Bill ID: hr811-110
Congress Session: 110
Date Processed: 2026-01-19 04:06:42 (UTC)
Introduced: 2007-02-05
Status: Introduced